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INTRODUCTION 
We are going to devote most of our attention in this talk to the RSA Public Key Cryp~ 
tosystem because it not only remains unbroken but it has some other useful features for 
digital signatures and authentication. 
We will briefly mention some other methods which have been compromised to some 
degree, and one, McEliece' s which has not, but which are still valid when both keys are 
kept secret and some have other features which may be useful. 
PUBLIC KEY SYSTEMS 
A public key cryptosystem is a cryptographic system in which each encryption process is 
governed by not one but two keys. The two keys are inverses of each other, that is to say 
anything encrypted with one can be decrypted with the other and vice versa. The impor-
tant additional property of a public key crptosystem is that given one of the keys, it is 
extremely difficult to find the other. This allows one of the keys to be made public while 
its inverse is kept secret, giving the systems their name. Public key cryptosystems have 
two very important properties. 
Because it is not necessary to keep both of the keys secret, one can be made readily avail-
able, published in a phonebook for example. Anyone wanting to transmit a confidential 
message can encrypt it in the public key of the addressee with assurance that only the 
addressee will be able to read it. 
Just as a message encrypted in a public key can be produced by anyone but can only be 
read by the holder of the corresponding secret key, a message encrypted in a secret key, a 
message encrypted in a secret key can be read by anyone. using the corresponding public 
key, but could only have been produced by the holder of the secret key. This gives it the 
fundamental property of a signature. 
Use is made of modular arithmetic. 
Mathematicians write the expression 
a :;b(mod m) 
(a is congruent to b modulo m) to denote the fact that the integer m divides exactly the 
difference of the integers a and b. For example, 
32:; -4(mod 12). 
Note that if the remainder on dividing a by m is b, then a == b (mod m). Hence, 
5124491" 12172(mod 21753). 
In fact, the remainder on dividing a by m is the only number b which is congruent to a 
modulo m such that 0 $; b < m. One very important cosequence of the definition of 
congruence is that if p (x) is any polynomial function of x with integer coefficients, then 
p (0)" p(b)(mod m) whenever 0" b(mod m). 
PUBLIC KEY DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM 
A public key distribution system is a mechanism which allows two people who have 
never had any prior secure contact to establish a secure channel "out of thin air", Public 
key distribution systems do not provide any signature mechanism but, at present, some 
are faster and more compact than public key cryptosystems which makes them better for 
many applications. 
The first practical public key distribution system makes use of the apparent difficulty of 
computing logarithms over a finite (Galois) field GF(q) with a prime number q of ele-
ments (the numbers (O,I, ... ,q-I) under arithmetic mod q). Let 
Y=axmod q,for 1 <X < q -I, 
where a. is a fixed primitive element of GF(q) (that is the powers of a range over the 
nonzero elements 1,2, ...• q-l of GF(q)), then X is referred to as the logarithm of Y to the 
base a, over GF(q): 
X = log.Y over GF(q), for 1 < Y < q - 1 . 
Calculation of Y from X is easy, taking at most 2log2q multiplications. For example 
a18 = «(a2h 2*a2. 
Computing X from Y, on the other hand can be much more difficult and, using the best 
known algorithm, has a computional complexity similar to finding the factors of a 
number close to q. Each user generates an independent random number Xi chosen uni-
fonnly from the set ofintegers 1,2, ... ,q-1. Xi is kept secret but 
x· Yj=a 'mod q 
is placed in a public file with the addressee's name and address. When users i and j wish 
to communicate privately they use 
xx· 
Kij=U ' J mod q 
as their key. User i computes Kij by obtaining Yj from the public file and letting 
Kij = Y7' mod q = (ax, l'mod q 
User j obtains K jj in similar fashion. 
Thus 
Kij = yJimod q 
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and of course 
X;X- xx-a . =a' lmodq. 
Another user must compute Kij from Yi and Yj , for example by computing 
K~~g(l.Yi =ai mod q 
'I 
before his/her own X" can be used to establish a bogus key 
X· XI; K,,=(a ') modq. 
If logarithms over GF(q) are easily computed, the system can be broken, but at present 
neither a threateningly fast method of doing this computation nor a way to bypass the 
logarithm and compute Kij from Yj and Yj without first obtaining either Xi or Xj is 
known. If q is a prime slightly less than w, all quantities are representable as w bit 
numbers. Exponentiation then takes at most 2xw multiplications over GF(q), while com· 
puting the logarithm requires q'A = 2w12 operations, using the best currently known algo· 
rithm. The cryptanalytic effort therefore grows exponentially relative to encryption or 
decryption. If w = 200, at most 400 multiplications are required to compute Yi from Xi, 
or Kij from Xi and Xj' yet taking logarithms over GF(q) is thought to require 2100 or 
approximately 1030 operations. This system can be implemented efficiently with respect 
to both speed and storage, and a variation in which q is not prime was the basis for an 
experimental local secure network at the Mitre Corporation. 
In the next sections we will see how modular arithmetic is used to convert the two prob-
lems, factorization and discrete logarithms, to public key cryptosystems. In fact, except 
for the scheme described by McEliece (see later) and Sloane, all known possible publIc 
key techniques are based on these two problems. 
THE RSA PUBLIC KEY CRYPTOSYSTEM. 
Shortly after the publication of Diffie and Hellman's seminal paper on public key cryp· 
tosystems, Rivest, Shamir and Adleman (for whom the RSA system is named) 
discovered a very elegant candidate for such a scheme. Their technique makes use of the 
following simple number theoretic result: if R = pq, where p, q are distinct primes, and 
$(R)=(P-l)(Q-l), then 
X¥R) " l(mod R), 
for any X which is not divisible by either P or Q. The designer of an RSA cryptosystem 
selects at random two large (about 100 digits) primes P and Q and calculates R = PQ. 
The designer also selects at random a value e( <R) such that the greatest common divisor 
of e and $(R) (denoted here by (e, $(R))) is 1. The congruence 
de" 1 (mod $(R)), 
is then solved for d such that 0 < d < R. There is a simple procedure for doing this, 
based on the Euclidean algorithm, which requires O(logR) operations. For this scheme 
the public encryption key is K 1 = {e,R} and the secret decryption key is K 2 = d. 
If some individual wishes to send a secure message M (such that gcd(M, R) = I and 
M < R) to the designer of this system, 
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is sent where 0 < C < R. The designer calculates 
D (C)" Cd" M,d "M1+kO(R) ,,(mod R). 
Since M < R, it can now be uniquely determined. It might appear that the problem of cal-
culating Me(mod R) for large e is very time consuming. In fact. there is a very simple 
and fast method for doing this which takes 0 (log2e) steps to complete. Briefly, it is 
done by performing a sequence of squaring and multiplication by M operations as indi-
cated by the binary representation of e (see [SEPI]). 
Consider the following simple example. Here we put p = 11, q = 19, R = 209, e = 17. 
We find that <I>(R)=1O.18 and 
17d" I(mod 180) 
for d = 53. IfM = 5, then 
2)X)2 
C" 517 " ((52) .5", 80(mod 209) and C = 80. 
To decrypt C, we calculate 
80" " ((((802.80)2), .80)2)' .80" 5(mod 209). 
The security of this scheme depends very much on the difficulty of factoring R. If a cryp-
tanalyst can factor R, d can be readily calculated and thus all ciphertext can be decrypted. 
There are a large number of different factoring methods currently known (see Guy 
[GUY]), but the most powerful of these techniques (Dixon [DIXO] and Schroeppe1 
[SCHR]) still require about 
e ..JiogNloglogN 
operations to factor N. Thus, a very fast computer (one multiprecise operation per 10-6 
seconds) might require 3.8xl09 years to factor a 200 digit number. It must be stressed 
here that many numbers which are very large can be factored relatively easily when their 
prime factors have certain special fonns. As an extreme example of this, we mention that 
it is known that the truly immense number 
224724 +1 
has 29.24727+1 as a factor. Hence, great care must be taken by the designer of this type 
of cryptosystem when selecting primes P and Q. This problem has been discussed in 
Rivest [RIVE] and Williams and Schmid [WISC]. Although it is true that anyone who 
can factor R can decrypt messages sent under this scheme, it is not know whether the act 
of decrypting these messages is equivalent in difficulty to factoring R. Simmons and 
Norris [SINO] and Herlestam [HERL] have attacked this cryptosystem by using the fact 
that if some P can be found such that 
then M can be found without having to factor R. But in [WISC] it is shown that 
the chance of finding such a value of P by a random search is very very small for 
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large, properly selected values of P and Q; 
a fast method of finding P can almost certainly be converted into a fast method of 
factoring R. 
Thus, it seems that, if the system designer has selected the value of R carefully, revealing 
its value and that of e gives too little information to a cryptanalyst in order for d to be 
deduced. For this reason it is felt that the RSA scheme is a valid public key cryptosys-
tern. 
In summary, we point out that this system has several important and desirable properties. 
It seems to be very secure (so far). 
The key size is small. 
It is also a signature scheme. 
Unfortunately, it also possesses some disadvantages. 
The processes of encryption and decryption are expensive. Approximately one 
second is needed per 6000 bits of information on a special purpose piece of 
hardware constructed at M.LT. (L. Adleman, personal communication). 
Determination of suitable keys is somewhat expensive. 
Reblocking of the message or two different R values are required when the system 
is used for signatures. 
We conclude this section by mentioning that some other cryptosystems have been 
developed which also use the difficulty of factoring as their means of providing security. 
One of these, the Lu-Lee (COMSAT) system [LULE], has been broken by Adleman and 
Rivest [ADRI] and others. Rabin [RAB!], Khoo, Bird and Seberry [KHBI], and Willi-
ams [WILL] have presented public key cryptosystems for which it can be shown that 
decryption is equivalent in difficulty to factoring. In view of this it would seem that these 
systems are superior to the RSA system; however, because of the constructive nature of 
the proofs of their security, all of these schemes may be susceptible to a selected cipher-
text attack [WILL]. This difficulty can be overcome by setting up the system very care-
fully, but the resulting schemes are somewhat cumbersome. It would be very desirable to 
have a nonconstructive proof of the equivalence of the problem of breaking the RSA sys-
tem and the problem of factoring; at the moment, this seems very far from being 
achieved. 
TRAPDOOR KNAPSACKS 
Another public key system is called the "trapdoor knapsack system," a name imagina-
tively derived from the notion of attempting to choose just the right set of rods from 
those in a box so that when packed into a long thing knapsack, the rods would fit tightly 
and not rattle. 
Trapdoor knapsacks have their roots in a field called combinatorial mathematics and 
depend on the fact that given a list of numbers it is easy to add up any specified subset, 
but given instead a list of numbers and a sum it is extremely difficult to discover a subset 
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which totals to exactly that sum. In order to do encryption in this system, the input block 
is treated as a specification of which numbers are to be selected from a list and added up; 
the output is their sum. The trapdoor knapsack system is based on Merkle's discovery 
that if the list of numbers is constructed correctly, certain details of that construction con· 
stitute a secret key which allows the constructor to take the sum and discover which 
members of the list were added. 
Given a vector of integers a ::;: (a1,a2, ...• an) and an integer S, the knapsack problem 
is to find a subset of the aj such that the sum of the elements of the subset is equal to S. 
Equivalently, given a and S find a binary n·vector x such that a'x = S. 
The knapsack problem is believed to be extremely difficult in general. belonging to a 
class of problems (the NP complete problems) that are thought not to be solvable in poly· 
nomial time on any detenninistic computer. 
Some cases of the knapsack problem are quite simple, however, and Merkle and 
Hellman's technique is to start with a simple one and convert it into a more complex 
fonn. 
The vector a can be used to encipher a block by fonning the dot product S ::;: a·x. 
Recovery of x from S involves solving a knapsack problem and was thus believed to be 
computationally infeasible if a and x are chosen randomly. 
If the vector a is selected so that each element is larger than the sum of the preceding ele· 
ments and each of the Xj is either 0 or I, its knapsack problem is very simple. For exam· 
pIe, if 
• a = (171,197,459,1191,2410) and 
x = (Xl,X2,X3,X4,XS) 
S' = 3798 
then x 5 must equal 1. If it were 0 then even if Xl = X2 = X3 = x4 =1, the dot product a'x 
would be too small. Then, knowing that x 5 = I, 
• • S - a, = 3798 - 2410 = 1388. 
must be a sum of a subset of the first four elements of x. Because 1388 > a; = 1191. x 
must equal 1. Finally 
SOX3=O,x2=I,andxl=O. 
This simple knapsack vector a* cannot be used as a public enciphering key because any-
one can easily recover x from S. The algorithim for generating public keys therefore gen· 
erates a random simple knapsack vector a * (with a hundred or more components) and 
keeps a * secret. It also generates a random number m which is larger than D:J. * and a 
random pair w, w-1 such that l-VW-1 = 1 mod m. It then generates the public knapsack 
vector or enciphering key Jl by mUltiplying each components of ex * by w mod m. 
jl=w·a* modm. 
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When another user wishes to send the message x to A he computes 
• S=Ct 'x 
and sends this to A. A uses his secret informati6n. w-1 and m to compute 
S* =wS mod m 
=w-1LajXj mod m 
=w-1L(wa.; mod m)xi mod m 
=I:(w-1wo.; mod m)xj mod m 
• =a 'X 
because m > La *. For example. if the secret vector 0;* is as above, then w :::; 2550 and M 
:::; 8443, results in the public vector, 
a = (5457,4213,5316,6013,7439), 
which hides the structure present in 0;*. 
The vector 0;* is published by the user as a public key. while the parameters w-1 and m 
are kept secret as the private key. They can be used to decipher any message which has 
been enciphered with the user's public key, by computing 
S* :;:: w-1 Srnod m 
and then solving the simple knapsack 
• • S =0; ·x. 
This process can be iterated to produce a sequence of vectors with seemingly more 
difficult knapsack problems by using transformations (wt> ml). (W2, m2), etc. The 
overall transformation is not, in general, equivalent to any single (w,rn) transfonnation. 
The trapdoor knapsack system requires special adaptation when used to produce signa-
tures [SEPI]. Unlike the RSA system, knapsack systems are quite fast and speeds of one 
megabit appear easy to obtain. Unfortunately, the public keys are quite large, requiring 
approximately ten-thousand bits. 
MERKLE· HELLMAN CRYPTOSYSTEM 
The first asymmetric cryptosystem based on the Knapsack Problem was invented by Mer-
kle and Hellman [MEHE781. The Merkle·Hellman cryptosystem (MH system) allows n· 
bit mess sages to be enciphered, 
(I) 
where rnj E {O,l} fori = l, ... ,n, using the public key K 
K=(kt,k 2 , •.• ,k.). (2) 
where kj E Zq :::; {1,2 ... , q-I} for i :::; I •...• n. and the integer q is prime. Using the pair 
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(M, K), the sender A creates the cryptogram C according to the following formula: 
n 
C = Lmiki, 
i=l (3) 
The enciphering process is extremely simple for it runs in linear time. To continue the 
description, we now consider the receiver B who always initiates the algorithm (the sys-
tem). The receiver first chooses the initial condition which is a sequence of superincreas-
ing integers 
where Wi: i = 1, ... ,n, are an integers which satisfy an inequality in the form: 
i-I 
Wi> ,Lwr 
j=l 
(4) 
(5) 
Note that the initial condition W defines the instance of the Easy Knapsack Problem 
which is solvable in linear time (see [SEPID. Now the designer B transfonns the instance 
of the Knapsack Problem. To do this, B first determines a suitable field blodZq (q must be 
prime and a multiplier r e Zq. Both q and r are usually chosen at random provided that 
n 
q> LWi' 
i=l 
Next, he/she injects the vector W into the field Zq according to the following congruence: 
ki ;:: wjr(mod q); i;:: 1, '" ,n. (6) 
The vector K :::::(k 1 , •.. , kn)is sent to the sender A via an insecure channel while the triple 
(the initial condition W, the integer r, the modulus q) is kept secret by the receiver. 
Assume now that the receiver A has obtained the cryptogram generated using (3). 
of all, B transfonns the cryptogram as follows: 
C' = Cr-' (mod q), 
From (3) and (5), we have 
n n 
C· == C,-l ;:: r.kimj,-l ;:: LWjmj(mod q). 
i=1 ;=1 
As Wi fulfills (5), the receiver easily finds components mi of the message M. 
First 
(7) 
(8) 
Example. To illustrate the Merkle-Hellman system, assume that 5 bit messages are to be 
transmitted. The receiver initiates the algorithm by choosing the vector 
w = (w" w2, w3, W4,WS) = (2,3,6,12,25), 
Note that 
8 
W4 >WI +w2w+3, and 
Ws >Wt +W2+w3+w4' 
Next he/she chooses the pair (r,q) at random provided that q is prime and 
q >wl +W2+W3+W4=48. Let q = 53 and r = 46. It is easy to check that 
r-1 = 15(mod 53). Subsequently, the receiver calculates the public key using (3.42), 
namely 
So, the public key 
k, ~ w,r(mod q) ~ 39 (mod 53), 
k2 ~ w2r(mod q) ~ 32 (mod 53), 
k3 ~ w3r(mod q) ~ 11 (mod 53), 
k4 ~ w 4r(mod q) ~ 23 (mod 53), 
ks ~ wsr(mod q) ~ 37 (mod 53). 
K~(k" k2' k3, k4' ks) ~~(39,32,11,22,37) 
is sent to the sender. Suppose now that the receiver has obtained the cryptogram C=119. 
To decrypt it, he/she first transfonns it as follows: 
C' ~ Cr-' ~ 119·15 ~ 36(mod 53), 
and next solves the simple knapsack problem: 
• as C ~36 > Ws ~25 we get ms ~ I, 
as C· -ws = 11 < W4 we get m4 =0, 
ase· -ws = 11 >w3 =6weget m3 = I, 
• as C - Ws - W3 = 5 > W2 = 3 we get m2 = 1, 
In other words the receiver has recreated the message M=(I,I,I,O,I). 
Shamir and Zippel [SHA80b] showed that, if the modulus q is compromised, the multi-
plier r can be readily calculated from the public key K. The obvious remedy is multiple 
applications of the initial condition in several different fields, i.e., W is injected into 
Zq\ Zq2' ... using multipliers rl,T2.···, and primes qj satisfying the inequality 
q 1'< Q2<"" The resulting cryptosystem is called the multiply iterated knapsack system. 
GRAHAM-SHAMIR CRYPTOSYSTEM 
Graham and Shamir [LEMP79] independently discovered a variant of the Merkle-
Hellman system to obscure the superincreasing property of initial conditions. A Graham 
Shamir initial condition vector W=(w I, ... ,wlI ) has the property that each Wj has the fol-
lowing binary representation: 
W;=R/jSj, 
where Rj and Sj are long random bit strings, and I is a bit string of length n such that 
j-th high-order bit is 1 and the remaining n-l bits are O's. Each random bit string Sj 
has log2n zero's in its high-order bit positions so that summing them does not cause them 
to overflow into the area of the Ij's. Thus. D = WxM has the binary representation 
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D=(R,M,Sl, 
n n 
whereR = I,Rjmj and S = I,Sjmj. Now the vector of bit strings «In, Sn), ... ,(I" S I»~ 
j=l j=l 
is a easy knapsack vector. The R/s are added to obscure the superincreasing property. 
These knapsacks are even easier to solve than Merkle-Hellman trapdoor knapsacks 
because M can be extracted from the binary representation of D. 
Example. Let n =5 when W is given by 
(R ,I, S I) = (011010 10000 000101) = w, 
(R212 S2) = (00100101000000011) = w2 
(R3 13 S3) = (010010 00100 000100) = W3 
(R 4 14 S4) = (011000 00010 000111) = w4 
(R 515 S 5) = (000110 00001000001) = w5' 
Let the message be M=(O,I,O,O,I). Then 
D = WxM =w2 +w5 
= (R2 + R 5; 12 + 15; S2 + S 5) = (00111101001000100). 
The initial condition W is converted to a hard knapsack vector K as in Merkle-Hellman 
scheme, by picking q and r and computing K = rW (mod q). Similarly. a message M is 
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enciphered as in the Merkle-Hellman system, whence C = Lkjmj. At the receiver's end, 
i=1 
C is deciphered by computing D=Cr-' (mod q) and extracting from D the bits represent-
ingM. 
Shamir and Graham believed this variant was safer, faster and simpler to implement than 
original scheme proposed by Merkle and Hellman. It has been broken by A. Sharnir. 
SECURITY OF THE MERKLE-HELLMAN SYSTEM 
Merkle and Hellman originally suggested using knapsacks of approximate size n=lOO. 
However, Schroeppel and Shamir [SCHR79] developed an algorithm to solve knapsacks 
of this size. By trading time and space their methexl can solve the knapsack problem in 
time T = O(2~n) and space O(2nI4 ). For n = 100, T = 250 ;::: lOiS. Thus a single proces-
sor can find a solution in 11,574 days. But for n=200, assuming 8.64 xlO IO instructions 
per day, the algorithm is computationally infeasible. 
The Merkle-Hellman system has two drawbacks which arise from its construction. They 
are the high cryptogram redundancy and the huge public key length. For n=200, every 
key component is 4OO-bit sequence, so the public key 
Once Merkle and Hellman had announced their cryptosystem, many scientists tried to 
break it. Merkle promised a prize of 1000 dollars to the first person to successfully crack 
his system. There are basically two attacks on the Merkle-Hellman system. The first 
relies upon finding an efficient algorithm to solve knapsacks defined in the fOIm required 
by the system. While there is no efficient algorithm to solve the general knapsack as it 
belongs to the class NPC, the knapsacks in question are only a small subset of all knap-
sacks. 
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The second attack is based on the knowledge of the public key only. The public key 
creates the hard knapsack. A number of articles addressed the following question: is 
there an pOlynomial time algorithm to calculate easy knapsacks (initial conditions) know-
ing the hard ones (public keys). Subsequently an algorithm was invented by Shamir 
([SHAM82]. Shamir's algorithm works for the basic Merkle-Hellman system only and 
not for all hard knapsacks vectors. At the same time Adleman [ADLE82, ADLE83] 
examined the iterated Merkle-Hellman system and showed that even this system is 
insecure. Some comments on his attack can be found in [BRI83c]. Next, Brickell 
[BRl83b] and Lagarias et al [LAG83b] proved that any cryptosystem based on low den-
sity knapsacks (the Merkle-Hellman system is one such knapsack) is breakable in poly-
nomial time. Subsequently, Lagarias [LAG82, LAG83a] examined applications of 
simultaneous diophantine approximation problems (see [CASS65]) to design a polyno-
mial time algorithm for breaking knapsack cryptosystems. 
The Merkle-Hellman system was finally shown to be insecure by Brickell (BRI84a, 
BRI851 who invented a polynomial time algorithm which allowed the easy knapsack vec-
tors to be recreated from the hard knapsack vectors. Brickell's algorithm was based upon 
the recently published algorithm for factoring polynomials with rational coefficients, due 
to LenSlra, Lenslra, and Lovasz [LEN82, LEN83]. Needless to say that Bricken won 
Merkle's prize of 1000 dollars. Readers interested in details of breaking the Merkle-
Hellman system are referred to two papers of Brickell et al [BRI83a, BRI83d] or the 
book by OConnor and Seberry [OCSE87]. 
CRYPTOSYSTEM BASED ON IDEMPOTENT ELEMENTS (PIEPRZYK) 
There are many modifications of the Merkle-Hellman system. We consider one of them 
described in [PIEP85]. In this modification called IE system, the simple knapsack is 
defined differently using idempotent elements. As before the system encrypts n-bit mes-
sages. The initial condition, however, consists of n different primes PI, ... ,Pn' If we 
accept thatN =Pl .... Pn' then the set ZN = {I, .... N-IJ, along with addition and multi-
plication modulo N defines a suitable arithmetic. The Chinese Remainder Theorem says 
that any integer a E ZN can be uniquely presented in the fonn of the vector: 
[al,"', an]; [a(modpl)"", a (modPn)]' 
Now there are n elementary idempotent elements of the fonn: 
el ; [l(mod PI), O(mod P2),"" O(mod Pn)]; [1,0, ... ,0] 
e2 ; [O(mod PI), I (mod P2),"" O(mod Pn)]; [0,1, ... ,0] (9) 
en; [O(mod PI), O(mod P2),"" l(mod PnO]; [0,0, ... , I]. 
The elements create an algebraic space and they can be used as basis vectors. To hide the 
vectors and simultaneously create the public key. The idempotent elements are 
transfonned using the random integer r and the modulus q as before, namely 
'" ; rei (mod q); i=I, ... ,n, (10) 
11 
n 
while q > !:ei and q is prime. Using the public key K=(k1 .... ,kn), the sender creates the 
i=l 
cryptogram C for the message M =(m 1- .•• ,mn) according to the following formula: 
u n 
C = I I,kj,mj, - I, kj;mj; I; 
i=l i=u+l (11) 
where both subsets of binary elementary messages M+ = mh •... ,milt and 
M- = mj I.··· ,mj are selected arbitrarily provided that M+ U M- ::; 0 contains all the 
• u+ ", + - 0 bmaryelementsmi; l::; l •...• n, andM (")M = . 
In turn, the receiver, having the cryptogram C, transforms it using the inverse r-1 as fol-
lows: 
C' = Cr-1(mod q). (12) 
Again, he/she calculates en ::;: N - C "'. As only one element of the pair (c", e") conveys 
the message. the receiver presents them as vectors of the fonn: 
• • d • C =[C mo PI> ... ,C modPnl 
C" = [C"mod p" ... ,C"mod Pn) (13) 
and selects the vector all of whose components are either -1 (mod Pi) or 1 (mod pi) for 
i=l, '" ,no Now if the cryptogram is generated by (11) and there is a vector, say C , all 
of whose components are from the set {O,I,-l}, then the second one, C", must contain at 
least one component (C" modpj) different from 0,1,-1 (modp·). To illustrate the enci-
phering and deciphering processes in IE system, consider the following example. 
Example. Assume that the communicating parties have agreed to transmit 5-bit mes-
sages and the receiver has already selected the initial condition 
(P"P2,P"P4,P5)~(2,3,5,711). Now N=p, . P2 . p, . P4 . Ps = 2310 and 
el = [1 modPI, 0 mod P2, Omodpl, OmodP4, OmodpsJ = 1l55(mod 2310). 
ez = [0 mod PI, 1 modp2, 0 mod Pl, OmodP4, OmodpsJ = 1545(mod 2310), 
e3 "" [0 mod P I. 0 mod P2, 1 mod Pl, 0 mod P4, 0 mod Ps] = 1389(mod 2310), 
e4 = [0 mod PI, 0 mod P2, o mod Pl, 1 mod P4, o mod Ps] = 330(mod 2310), 
es = [0 mod PI, 0 mod P2, 0 mod P3, 0 mod P4, 1 mod Ps];: 21O(mod 2310), 
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If the receiver now selects the modulus q = 4637 > Lej = 4621 (q is prime) and picksr = 
i=l 
3475 at random (r-1 = 3372), then components of the public key are: 
k, = e,r(mod q) = 1155.3475 = 2620(mod 4637), 
k2 = e2r(mod q) = 1540.3475 = 402(mod 4637), 
k, = e,r(mod q) = 1386.3475 = 3144(mod 4637), 
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k. = e.r(mod q) = 330.3475 = 1411(mod 4637), 
k, = e,r(mod q) = 210.3475 = 1741(mod 4637). 
In other words the public key is 
K=(2620,402,3144,1411,1741 ). 
Here, both the initial condition and the pair (r, q) are kept secret. Using K, the sender can 
encipher his/her message M=(1,O,l,l,l). First, he/she constructs two subsets M+ and 
M-, Let them be M+={ ml,m2,m4} and M- = { m3,mS}. Next he/she computes the 
cryptogram 
Finally, the cryptogram is forwarded to the receiver. In turn, the receiver, knowing the 
inverse element r-1• transforms the cryptogram 
C' = Cr-1(mod q) = 854.3372 = l11(mod 4637). 
Now, one element of the pair (C* = 111, en = N - C' = 1199) conveys the message. To 
find this element, the receiver converts the pair into vectors 
C' = [111(mod 2), 111(mod 3), 111(mod 5,) 111(mod 7), 111(mod 11)] = [1,0,1,6,1] = [1,0,1,-1,1], 
C" = [1199(mod 2), 1199(mod 3), 1199(mod 5), 1199(mod 7), 1199(mod 11) = [1,2,',2,0]. 
The first vector indicates the message m = [1,0,1,1,1]. 
OTHER PROPOSALS FOR PUBLIC KEY CRYPTOSYSTEMS, 
Some other cryptosystems have also been developed which are based on the knapsack 
problem but we cannot develop them futher here. 
Leung and Vacon [LEVA] have presented a cryptosystem, designed around the knapsack 
problem, which seemed to be very secure. Unfortunately, when this system was being 
used, it was necessary to transmit 100 times more ciphertext than corresponding message 
text. We also mention that Shamir [SHAM] has developed a signature scheme around 
the knapsack problem. This scheme, while requiring a large key, is still very simple and 
fast; however, it has been broken as a public syatem and was not designed to be used as 
a cryptosystem. 
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McELIECE'S ALGEBRAIC CODES CRYPTOSYSTEM 
McEliece suggested in 1978 [MCEL78] that error correcting codes are excellent candi~ 
dates for providing public-key cryptosystems. His work has not received the prom-
inence, or detailed study it deserves, because error correcting codes are effective by virtue 
of their redundancy, which leads to data expansion, which has not usually been con-
sidered desirable in cryptography. 
The author believes that when security is required on noisy channels, such as satellite 
communications, mobile radios or car telephones, error correction incorporated with 
security is the wisest course to take. It may be that encryption should be applied first and 
then error correction via, say convolutional codes is most appropriate. Nevertheless, the 
combined area of encryption and error correction, is valuable to study for both digital and 
analogue systems. 
McEliece based his cryptosystem on the Goppa codes, a superset of the BCH or the 
Hamming polynomial codes, because they are easy to implement in hardware and a fast 
decoding algorithm exists for the general Goppa cods while no such fast decoding algo-
rithm exists for a general linear code. 
Corresponding to each irreducible pOlynomial, 
of degree t over GF(2m), there exists a binary irreducible Goppa code of length n =2m. 
dimension k > n -tm, capable of correcting any pattern of t or fewer errors. 
Patterson has given a fast algorithm, with running time, O(nt), for decoding these codes 
(see[MCEL77, Problem S.IS)). 
The cryptosystem designer now chooses a desirable value of n and t and then randomly 
picks an irreducible polynomial of degree t over GF(2m). The probability that a randomly 
selected polynomial of degree t is irreducible is about lit and Berlekamp [BERL6S, 
Chapter 8] describes a fast algorithm for testing irreducibility so this is a reasonable step. 
Next the system designer produces a kxn generator matrix G for the code, which could 
be in canonical form, that is 
G = [It F,x(n-k)]. 
The usual error correction method would now multiply a message vector a = 
(a}ta2 ..... ak) onto G to fonn the codeword b = (b}tb2 • ... bn ) which is transmitted via 
a channel which usually corrupts the codeword to b l which must be then corrected and 
then the message recovered. 
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If a were multiplied onto G in the canonical fonn b would be 
and if there was no corruption the message is trivially recovered as the first k bits of h. 
Thus McEliece "scrambles" G by selecting a random dense kxk nonsingular matrix S, 
and a random nXn pennutation matrix P. He then computes 
G' =SGP' 
which generates a linear code with the same rate and minimum distance as the code gen-
erated by G. G' is called the public generator matrix. 
Sloane [SLOA79] has written an excellent article describing how the random matrices S 
and P can be obtained. 
Thus the algorithm can be described as 
Encryption: Divide the data to be encrypted into k-bit blocks. If u is such a block, 
transmit x = uG' + z where G' is the public generator matrix and z is a locally gen-
erated random vector of length n and weight t. 
Decryption: On receipt of x the receiver computes x'xp-1 where p-l is the inverse 
of the permutation matrix P. x' will then be a codeword of the Gappa code previ-
ously chosen. 
The decoding algorithm is then used to find u = U'S-1 
SECURITY OF McELEICE'S CRYPTOSYSTEM. 
The encryption and description algorithms can be implemented quite simply. We need to 
determine the security of the system. If an opponent knows G' and intercepts x can 
helshe' recover u. There are two possible attacks: 
to try to recover G from G' and so be able to use the decoding algorithm; 
to attempt to recover u from x without knowing G. 
The first attack appears hopeless if n and t are large enough because there are so many 
possibilities for G, not to mention the possibilities for S and P. 
The second attack seems more promising but the basic problem to be solved is that of 
decoding a more or less arbitrary (n, k) linear code in the presence of up to terrors. 
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Berlekamp, McEliece and van Tilborg [BEM178] have proved that the general coding 
problem for linear codes if NP-complete, so one can certainly expect that if the code 
parameters are large enough, that this attack too will be infeasible. 
Example. If n=1024=2 sup 10 and 1=50 there are about 10149 possible Goppa polynomi-
als and vast number of choices for San P. The dimension of the code will be about 524. 
Hence, a brute-force approach to decoding based on comparing x to each codeword has a 
work factor of about S524=10158 ; and a brute-force approach based on coset leaders has a 
work factor of about 2500 = 1 0151 • 
A more promising attack is to select k of the coordinates randomly and hope none are in 
error and then calcu!ate u. The probability of no error, however, is about 
(I-lin)', 
and the amount of work involved in solving k simultaneous equations in k unknowns is 
about k3 • Hence before finding u using this attack one expects a work factor of 
For n;\024,k;524,1;50 this is about \019=265 . 
Remark. This algorithm would have a communication rate of about 106 bits/sec so 
would have quite viable implication speeds. On the other hand this cryptosystern is not 
suitable for producing "signatures" as the algorithm is truly asymmetric and not one to 
one. Other authors e.g. Kak [KAK83], have discussed joint encryption and error-
correction coding suggested further avenues for research. 
In this section and the last we have seen that many possible public key cryptosystems 
have been developed. Even though all of them have certain disadvantages. if not secure 
for secret public key use, several of them may. with limited usage, be used for the very 
important task of exchanging the secret keys needed by certified conventional cryptosys-
terns. The exchanging of these keys, a very important proble which has not, in general 
been satisfactority solved. need not take place very often but must be done in an environ-
ment of extreme security. 
CONCLUSION 
In spite of the number of proposed public key cryptosystems. it must be stressed here that 
we are still a long way from demonstrating that any of them is provably secure. Since the 
problem of factoring is so old, it might be felt that a scheme which is as difficult to break 
as it is difficult to factor a certain large number is. in a sense. certified in its security. 
However, it could be that in the future someone might develop a method that can be used 
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to factor numbers of a certain (but now unknown) type. In a directory of public keys for 
cryptosystems based on the factoring problem there could be several schemes whose 
security would be compromised by this discovery. At the moment we simply have no 
way of knowing whether this could occur. 
Also. it should not be forgotten that there is the possibility that no such thing as a prov-
ably secure public key cryptosystem exists. This would certainly seem to be the case if it 
were ever proved that P = nCo--NP [SEPlj. 
The simple elegance and beauty of several of these recent public key encryption schemes 
should not be allowed to lull us into a feeling of complacency. 
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